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I. INTRODUCriON
In 1973, the United States Congress passed the Endangered Species
Act (ESA)l in response to growing public concern over the accelerating
rate of extinction of wildlife species in the United States.' Section 4(a) of
the ESA requires the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Inte-
nor to determine whether any species is "endangered" or "threatened" and
to designate the critical habitat necessary for the continued survival of
such species.' Section 4(b) of the ESA requires that the designation of
critical habitat be based on the "best scientific data available taking
into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of
specifying any particular area as critical habitat.' 4 Like most environmen-
tal protection statutes, the ESA also contains a citizen-suit provision that
allows citizens to act as "private attorneys general," supplementing federal
government enforcement of these statutes.5
Bennett v. Plenerte addresses the standing issue concerning plaintiffs
bringing citizen suits challenging governmental actions taken pursuant to
the ESA. In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals narrowed the
scope of the citizen-suit provision of the ESA by using a "zone of inter-
ests" test to exclude from standing any plaintiffs not alleging an interest m
the preservation of endangered species.7 Using the zone of interests test,
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs in Bennett, Oregon ranchers and
irrigation districts, lacked standing under the citizen-suit provision of the
ESA because they sought to protect their irrigation water from federal
government actions designed to benefit endangered sucker fish in two
Bureau of Reclamation reservoirs!
Bennett is a significant case because it is one of the latest attempts by
* J.D. expected 1998, School of Law, Umversity of Montana; M.A., History, 1993, Umversity
of Montana; BA., History, 1985, Uinversity of Washington.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
2. ROBERT V PERCiVAL ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGuLATON 1181-90 (2d ed. 1996).
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1994).
4. See § 1533(b)(2).
5. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 1077 (describing 16 U.S.C. § 1540).
6. 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom, Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
7. See 63 F.3d at 919.
8. Id. at 921.
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the federal court system to clarify the issue of standing in environmental
suits in the wake of Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,9 the case in which the
Umted States Supreme Court established a constitutional test for standing
for plaintiffs suing under citizen-suit provisions of federal statutes. 0
Bennett is also significant because it will be the case in which the Su-
preme Court clarifies the issue of standing under the ESA, and decides
whether the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the zone of interests test will
stand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF BENNETT V PLENERT
The Klamath Project was constructed in the early twentieth century,
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau), for the purpose of
providing irrigation water to farmers and ranchers living in an and region
of southern Oregon and northern California." The Klamath Project con-
sists of several lakes, reservoirs, and rivers which are utilized to store and
transport water used to irrigate approximately 240,000 acres. 2 Two reser-
voirs are used to store water in the eastern portion of the Klamath Project:
Clear Lake Reservoir, located in California, and Gerber Reservoir, located
in Oregon." The waters of the Klamath Project are home to two species
of endangered fish, the Lost River sucker (Deltistes luxatus) and the
shortnose sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris).4
In 1988, the Lost River sucker and shortnose sucker were listed as
endangered species under the ESA. 5 In 1991, the Bureau, concerned over
population declines of the listed suckers, initiated consultation with the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), pursuant to section 7
of the ESA. 6 In 1992, the USFWS issued its Biological Opinion, con-
cluding that unless the Bureau took mitigating action, the "long-term oper-
ation of the Klamath Project is likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of the Lost River and shortnose suckers."'7 In August, 1992,
9. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
10. See id. at 560-61. Under Lujan, to have standing a plaintiff must show: 1) an injury in fact;
2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and 3) the likelihood that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.
11. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at *10a, Bennett v. Plenert, 1993 WL
669429 (D. Or. 1993) (No. 93-6076-HO) (Complaint appears as an appendix to Bnef for Petitioners on
Writ of Certiorari, 1996 WL 277131, at *5a).
12. Appellee's Brief at 8, Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-35008),
rev'd., 117 S. CL 1154 (1997) (on file with author).
13. Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, at *10a, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO).
14. Id., see also 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130, 27,133 (1988).
15. Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, *10a, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO); see also 53 Fed. Reg.
27,130, 27,133 (1988).
16. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 916.
17. Id.
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the Bureau notified the USFWS that it intended to comply with the miti-
gation measures recommended by the USFWS in the Biological Opinion,
which included the maintenance of mnmum reservoir levels in Clear
Lake and Gerber reservoirs. 8 In order to maintain the minimum water
levels recommended by the Biological Opinion, the Bureau would have to
store more water in the reservoirs, making less water available for
irrigation. 9
On March 8, 1993, the Plaintiffs, two Oregon ranchers and two Ore-
gon irrigation districts who receive their irrigation water from Clear Lake
and Gerber reservoirs, filed suit in federal district court against the Direc-
tor and Regional Director of the USFWS, and the Secretary of the Inten-
or." Plaintiffs claimed violations of the ESA in the preparation of the
Biological Opinion, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring
the Bureau and the USFWS to withdraw portions of the Biological Opin-
ion, thus allowing the release of more water from the reservoirs for imga-
tion.2' The Plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under the citizen-suit provision
of the ESA.
The Plaintiffs argued that the Biological Opinion, by setting mini-
mum water levels in the two reservoirs in question, had, in effect, desig-
nated critical habitat for the suckers without taking into account the eco-
nomic impacts of the designation, as required by section 4 of the ESA.'
The Plaintiffs also challenged the Biological Opinion, claiming that it
showed that the populations of suckers in Clear Lake Reservoir and
Gerber Reservoir were healthy despite the use of these reservoirs for irri-
gation purposes for nearly a century.24 The Plaintiffs claimed the decline
of the sucker populations had occurred only in the western portion of the
Klamath Project, in waters not physically connected to the two reservoirs
in question.'
According to the Plaintiffs, the Biological Opinion violated section 7
of the ESA by improperly concluding that continued operation of the
Klamath Project was likely to jeopardize the existence of the suckers.'
The Plaintiffs argued that there was no credible evidence to show that
18. Id.
19. 1d.
20. Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, *5a, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO). The regional director, Re-
gion One, of the USFWS was Marvin L. Plenert, the director of the USFWS was John F. Turner, and
the Secretary of the Intenor was Bruce Babbitt. Id.
21. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 916.
22. Bennett, 1993 WL 669429, at *1.
23. Id
24. Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, *10a-*lla, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO).
25. Id. at *12a.
26. Id. *14a-*15a.
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restricting water releases from the reservoirs would benefit the endangered
suckers.27 Thus, the Plaintiffs also asserted that the Biological Opinion
was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) .2
On May 27, 1993, the federal government filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' action, arguing that the Plaintiffs lacked standing under the
ESA, and that the Biological Opinion was not an agency action subject to
judicial review under the APA 9 The government also argued that
Plaintiffs' claim of a de facto designation of critical habitat was invalid
because the "issuance of a biological opinion does not constitute a desig-
nation of critical habitat.,
30
On November 19, 1993, Judge Michael R. Hogan, of the U.S. District
Court for Oregon, granted the government's motion to dismiss.3' The
court held that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims under the
ESA because "the recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests ad-
vanced by plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interests sought to be
protected by ESA."'32 The court also did not agree that the Biological
Opinion constituted a de facto designation of critical habitat for the suck-
ers, and found that this issue would be more appropriately handled by a
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)33 claim. 4 The Plaintiffs
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.35
1H. THE NINTH CiRcurr COURT'S HOLDING
The primary issue in Bennett is who has standing under the citizen-
suit provision of the ESA.36 The Ninth Circuit, in a decision written by
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, held that this question would be answered by
applying the zone of interests test to determine prudential standing, the
issue the district court had likewise found dispositive 7
27. Id. at *14a.
28. Id. *15a (alleging violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)).
29. Appellant's Bnef at 2, Bennett (No. 94-35008); Appellee's Brief at 10- 1i, Bennett (No. 94-
35008).
30. Bennett, 1993 WL 669429, at *1 (quoting Federal Defendant's Memorandum (# 4)).
31. Id. at *5.
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994). NEPA sets out procedural requirements for "major feder-
al action[s]." In order to state a NEPA claim, the Plaintiffs would have to show that the Biological
Opinion constituted a major federal action, with substantial environmental effects, and that it adversely
affected their interests. See Bennett, 1993 WL 669429, at *5 n.4.
34. Bennett, 1993 WL 669429, at *5 & n.4; but see Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. Umted
States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that economic interests were not to be
included in the zone of interests protected by NEPA).
35. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 915.
36. See id. at 917.
37. Id.
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The court discussed the origin of the zone of interests test in Data
Processing Service v. Camp, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs seeking judicial review under the APA must show that the inter-
est they seek to protect is protected or regulated by the statute m ques-
tion 9 The Ninth Circuit, citing Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n,4
held that the zone of interests test applies to statutory citizen-suit provi-
sions, like the one included in the ESA.4 The Ninth Circuit adopted
Clarke's holding concerning the application of the zone of interests test to
a "plaintiff who is not directly subject to the regulatory action that he
seeks to challenge . ."' The test demes standing "if the plaintiff's in-
terests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes im-
plicit in the statute that it cannot be reasonably assumed that Congress in-
tended to permit the suit."4
After determining that the zone of interests test applied to the ESA's
citizen-suit provision, the Ninth Circuit held that "only plaintiffs who
allege an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall within the
zone of interests protected by the ESA." The court held that the Plain-
tiffs in Bennett had no standing under the zone of interests test because
they did not "seek to further the statutory purpose" of the ESA.' The
court pointed to the failure of the Plaintiffs to affirmatively plead an inter-
est in the preservation of the endangered suckers in their complaint.4
Since the Plaintiffs did not "allege any community of interest between
themselves and the suckers," but rather, according to the court, claimed a
competing interest, they lacked standing under the ESA.47
The court found that since the Plaintiffs had no standing under the
ESA, they also had no standing under the APA, since the same zone of
interests test applies to both statutes; and because the Plaintiffs had not
stated a NEPA claim, they had no standing under NEPA either.4 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' ac-
38. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
39. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 917.
40. 479 U.S. 388 (1987). Under Clarke, the key to the zone of interests test is determining
congressional intent. The Clarke Court held that "the 'zone of interest' test is a guide for deciding
whether, in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a par-
ticular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision." Id. at 399.
41. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 918.
42. Id. at 917.
43. Id. at 917-18 (citing Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399).
44. Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at921.
46. Id. at 919.
47. Id. at 921.
48. Id. at 922.
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tlon.49
IV STANDING AND THE ZONE OF INTERESTS TEST
In its 1992 decision, Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme
Court determined that plaintiffs utilizing the citizen-suit provision of the
ESA must meet certain requirements to have Article m constitutional
standing to invoke federal jurisdiction." Under Lujan, in order to have
standing a plaintiff must show- 1) an injury in fact; 2) a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and 3) the likelihood
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. "
In footnote seven of Lujan, the Court also stated that a plaintiff's
failure to satisfy every Article III standing requirement might not jeopar-
dize the plaintiff's standing.52 The Court stated that a plaintiff "who has
been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert
that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy "" The Court described a person living next to a dam, and
suing over an issue concerning the operation of the dam, as being an
example of the type of plaintiff who would fit the footnote seven standing
requirements.54
In denying the Plaintiffs in Bennett standing under the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA, the Ninth Circuit held that in addition to meeting
the constitutional standing test outlined in Lujan, the Plaintiffs must also
meet an additional prudential test for standing-the zone of interests test-
and that Plaintiffs' failure to meet this test was dispositive regarding the
issue of standing.55 The Ninth Circuit stated that standing may be decided
on prudential grounds without first undertaking the constitutional mqui-
ry
56
In applying the zone of interests test to the citizen-suit provision of
the ESA, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Defenders of Wildlife v Hodel.7 In Defenders, the Eighth Circuit, citing
Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood,58 determined that Congress
49. Id.
50. 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
51. Id. at 560-61.
52. Id. at 572 n.7.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 63 F.3d at 917.
56. Id. at 917 n.1 (citing Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 921
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
57. Defenders, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see Bennett, 63 F.3d at 918 n.3.
58. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
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could eliminate prudential standing reqirements, like the zone of interests
test, by legislation 9 The Eighth Circuit determined congressional intent
by examining the plain language of the ESA's citizen-suit provision,
which states that "any person" may commence a suit based on a violation
of the ESA, and held that a plaintiff "need meet only the constitutional
requirements for standing for their claims under the ESA."
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has joined the Ninth Circuit in holding
that the prudential zone of interests test does apply to the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA.6' However, the D.C. Circuit has not been called
upon to clearly delineate the boundaries of the zone of interests test as it
applies to the ESA, nor has it used the zone of interests test to deny stand-
Ing to plaintiffs asserting an economic injury under the ESA.62
In two cases decided before Bennett, Pacific Northwest Generating
Cooperative v. Brown,' and Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy," the
Ninth Circuit had applied the zone of interests test to plaintiffs utilizing
the ESA's citizen-suit provision.' In Mount Graham Red Squirrel, the
Ninth Circuit applied the zone of interests test to an ESA suit, in a manner
consistent with its later application of the test m Bennett.' In Mount
Graham Red Squirrel, the court found that environmental plaintiffs had
standing to challenge alleged violations of section 9 of the ESA because
they sought to protect endangered squirrels and could demonstrate injury
in fact.6'
However, in Pacific Northwest, the Ninth Circuit, citing the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Defenders, stated that it was an "open question"
whether or not plaintiffs suing under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA
had to satisfy the zone of interests test in addition to the Article I consti-
tutional standing requirements.' Despite tins apparent ambivalence, the
court assumed that the zone of interests requirement had been met by the
plaintiffs.' However, in Pacific Northwest, the Ninth Circuit held that
plaintiffs asserting claims based upon economic interests were not auto-
59. Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1039.
60. Id.
61. See Idaho ex rel. Idaho Pub. Utilities Conm'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 35 F.3d
585, 590-91 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 61 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
62. Bnef for Petitioner, Bennett, 1996 WL 277131, at *24 n.14.
63. 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. 986 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir. 1993).
65. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 918.
66. See Mount Graham Red Sqwrrel, 986 F.2d at 1582-83.
67. Id. at 1581 n.8.
68. Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Defenders, 851 F.2d at 1039).
69. 38 F.3d at 1065.
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matically excluded from the zone of interests protected by the ESA."
The Ninth Circuit reached this decision despite its finding that the plain-
tiffs in Pacific Northwest, hydropower producers and consumers, would
have been as well off if three listed species of endangered salmon were
extinct as they would have been if the fish were flourishing.7 Because
the plaintiffs in Pacific Northwest had also alleged an interest in the pres-
ervation of the salmon, the court found they had satisfied the zone of
interests test.72
In Central Arizona Water Conservation District. v. EPA,' the Ninth
Circuit also applied the zone of interests test to determine standing, under
the provision of the Clean Air Act74 (CAA) that allows judicial review of
administrative rules promulgated under the authority of the CAA (here, to
protect the air in the Grand Canyon).7' The plaintiffs in Central Arizona
were irrgation districts who alleged that economic injury would result
from a final rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).76
Despite the EPA's arguments that such economic interests were not within
the zone of interests protected by the CAA, the Ninth Circuit found that
under the "permissive standard" set by Clarke, the economic interests of
the plaintiffs fell within the zone of interests protected by the CAA's
visibility provisions.'
V THE NINTH CIRCUiT COURT'S REASONING IN BENNETT V PLENERT
In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit Court defined the purposes of the ESA
as "singularly devoted to the goal of species preservation." ' Quoting the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, the
Ninth Circuit stated: "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute
was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost. ' 79 Guided by this interpretation of the ESA, the Ninth Circuit used
the zone of interests test to deny standing to plaintiffs seeking to protect
economic interests under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA.'
The court ignored the issue of Article I constitutional standing, in
effect conceding that the Plaintiffs in Bennett were entitled to standing
70. Id. at 1065-66.
71. Id. at 1065.
72. Id.
73. 990 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994).
75. See 990 F.2d at 1533, 1538-39.
76. Id. at 1533-34.
77. Id. at 1539.
78. 63 F.3d at 920.
79. Id. (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
80. 63 F.3d at 919.
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under Lujan.8 It seems clear that the Plaintiffs suffered economic "injury
m fact" because of the reallocation of Klamath Project water from them to
the endangered suckers, an action taken under the authority of the ESA.'
The Ninth Circuit apparently acknowledged the Plaintiffs' injury m fact
when it stated: "they claim a competing interest-an interest in using the
very water that the government believes is necessary for the preservation
of the species." 3 The causation element of the Lujan test seems also to
have been met because the alleged failure of federal officials to comply
with the ESA resulted in the reallocation of water from the Plaintiffs to
the fish. 4 The Ninth Circuit, in Central Arizona, held that the involve-
ment of an intermediate third party, like the Bureau in Bennett, does not
undermine a plaintiff's causation argument if "the government's action [is]
substantially likely to cause the petitioner's injury despite the presence of
intermediary parties."' Finally, the redressability prong of the constitu-
tional standing test was satisfied because setting aside the Biological Opin-
ion and enjoining the federal agencies from acting in alleged violation of
sections 4 and 7 of the ESA would restore the Plaintiffs' priority status for
receiving Klamath Project water. 6
It also seems clear that the Plaintiffs in Bennett did have at least
Lujan footnote seven standing under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Pacific
Northwest. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs, hydro-
power producers and consumers seeking to protect their economic inter-
ests, probably had footnote seven standing because they were "entities
whose way of conducting business may be affected by the alleged failures
of the federal agencies under the Endangered Species Act." Similarly,
the Plaintiffs in Bennett lived close to the reservoirs in question and im-
plementation of the Biological Opinion would have deprived them of
irrigation water, thus affecting their way of conducting business.
In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit applied the zone of interests test articu-
lated in Data Processing, where the Supreme Court held that to establish
standing, a plaintiff must show that "the interest sought to be protected by
[the plaintiff was] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 9 How-
81. Id. at 917.
82. See Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, at *8a-*9a, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO).
83. 63 F.3d at 921.
84. See Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, at *8a-*9a, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO).
85. Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1538 (quoting Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admi., 901 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
86. See Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, at *8a-*9a, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO).
87. Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065.
88. See Complaint, 1996 WL 277131, at *8a-*9a, Bennett (No. 93-6076-HO).
89. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., 397 U.S. at 153).
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ever, in Bennett, the Ninth Circuit focused only on the zone of interests
protected by the ESA, and not on the zone of interests regulated by the
ESA.
In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit also cited the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Clarke m applying the zone of interests test to determine
whether Congress intended to permit plaintiffs asserting an economic
interest to utilize the citizen-suit provision of the ESA.9° The Ninth Cir-
cuit quoted the Clarke Court as follows: "[A]t bottom the reviewability
question turns on congressional intent, and all indicators helpful in dis-
cerning that intent must be weighed."' However, in Bennett, the Ninth
Circuit downplayed indicators that Congress intended to provide certain
procedural safeguards for interests regulated under the ESA.' The court
also ignored the part of the Clarke holding which stated: "The [zone of
interests] test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there
need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be
plaintiff."'93
The Ninth Circuit discounted congressional amendments to the ESA,
made after Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, for the purpose of taking
into account the economic impacts of designating critical habitat for en-
dangered species.94 Concerning these amendments, the court stated that
they were intended to do no more than "ensure a rational decision-making
process by providing guidance for government officials."95 The Ninth
Circuit's view of the purpose of these amendments does not correspond
well with the legislative history, which showed that Congress intended for
the amendments to increase the flexibility of the ESA with regard to the
potential economic impacts of species listing and critical habitat desig-
nation.96 However, by addressing this issue, the court seemed to acknowl-
edge the Plaintiffs' claim that a de facto critical habitat designation had
taken place. The issue of de facto critical habitat designation is very im-
portant in light of the fact that, as of 1993, critical habitat designations
had not been made for more than eighty percent of all species listed under
the ESA.'
The interpretation of Clarke used by the Ninth Circuit in Bennett also
contradicts its earlier holding in Central Arizona Water Conservation
90. See Bennett, 63 F.3d at 917-18.
91. Id. at 918 (emphasis added) (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400).
92. 63 F.3d at 921.
93. 479 U.S. at 399-400 (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)).
94. 63 F.3d at 921.
95. Id.
96. Brief for Petitioner, Bennett, 1996 WL 277131, at *37-*40.
97. Oliver Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S. Departments
of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. CoLO. L. REv. 277, 322 (1993).
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District v. EPA.9" In Central Arizona, irrigation districts suing to protect
economic interests under the visibility provisions of the CAA99 were
granted standing by the Ninth Circuit using the zone of interests test."°°
The Ninth Circuit, citing its earlier interpretation of Clarke in National
Wildlife Federation v. Burford, stated that the zone of interests test was
"not meant to be particularly demanding."'0 ' Therefore, the court rejected
the EPA's argument that the plaintiffs' economic injury was not within the
zone of interests of the CAA. The court in Central Arizona held that
the CAA required the EPA administrator to consider the cost of compli-
ance in setting clean air standards, and thus: "[A]s entities required to pay
those costs of compliance, the [plaintiffs'] interests cannot reasonably be
described as marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes of the
Act."'0 3 However, in Bennett, despite the fact that the ESA requires that
economic impacts be assessed when designating critical habitat; the Ninth
Circuit found that the Plaintiffs' claims were "at best 'marginally related'
to the purposes that underlie the Act.
In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit held that because the Plaintiffs had
failed to claim the government's actions would harm the endangered suck-
ers, they did not seek to further the statutory purpose of the ESA." The
court found that the Plaintiffs had no "community of interest" with the
endangered suckers, and in fact were asserting a "competing interest"
because they wanted to use water that the government believed was need-
ed by the suckers." However, in Pacific Northwest, the Ninth Circuit
found that plaintiffs asserting economic interests similar to those of the
Plaintiffs in Bennett had standing under the ESA because they had claimed
government actions that harmed their economic interests also harmed
endangered salmon in the Columbia River system."° Although Pacific
Northwest supports the holding in Bennett regarding pleading require-
ments, the Pacific Northwest court seemed more willing to recognize that
economic interests and the interests of endangered species did not neces-
sarily conflict with each other, stating that "a narrow or cynical under-
98. Central Arizona, 990 F.2d 1531.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7491.
100. See 990 F.2d at 1539.
101. Id. at 1538 (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 871 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir.
1989)).
102. 990 F.2d at 1538.
103. ILd. at 1539.
104. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 921 (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065.
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standing of economic interest is not decisive."
108
In Pacific Northwest, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did
not "have an economic interest only in extiction," even though they
would have been as well off if three listed species of endangered salmon
were extinct."° The Ninth Circuit could find no "irremediable conflict of
interest between the consumers of hydropower and the fish in the
streams..... Yet, in Bennett, the court found such a conflict between us-
ers of irrigation water and the suckers in the reservoirs."'
In Pacific Northwest, the Ninth Circuit stated that the critical question
in determining whether the plaintiffs satisfied the zone of interests test was
"whether the plaintiffs' economic interest is a legal interest protected by
the Endangered Species Act.""' 2 The court concluded that the plaintiffs
had "a genuine economic interest in preserving the salmon and therefore
an interest protected by the Endangered Species Act."'"3 In Bennett, the
court held that because the Plaintiffs had failed to affirmatively claim an
interest in preserving the endangered suckers, they had no similar interest
protected by the ESA."4
The Ninth Circuit has been consistent in applying the zone of inter-
ests test to determine whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge actions
taken by federal regulatory agencies under the citizen-suit provisions of
federal statutes." 5 However, the Ninth Circuit has been inconsistent in
the standards it has applied to determine congressional intent, the key
determination, according to Clarke, in definmg the zone of interests pro-
tected by, or regulated by, a particular statute." 6
In cases like Bennett, the Ninth Circuit has strictly construed congres-
sional intent to grant standing only to plaintiffs clearly protected by the
particular statute." 7 In Nevada Land Action Association v United States
Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs' economic inter-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 921.
112. Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065.
113. Id.
114. Bennett, 63 F.3d at 921.
115. See Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.
1993) (zone of interests test applied to citizen-suit provision of NEPA); Dan Caputo Co. v. Russian
River County Sanitation, 749 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1984) (zone of interests test applied to citizen-
suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA)); Alvarez v. Longboy, 697 F.2d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir.
1983) (zone of interests test applied to citizen-suit provision of the Farm Laborer Contractor Registra-
tion Act); Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1982) (zone of interests test applied to
citizen-suit provision of CWA).
116. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400.
117. See Bennett, 63 F.3d at 919; see also Dan Caputo Co., 749 F.2d at 575; Nevada Land
Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 716.
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ests were not included in the zone of interests protected by NEPA, and, in
fact, their suit was likely to frustrate the environmental protection objec-
tives of NEPA."'
However, m cases like Central Arizona, the Ninth Circuit has applied
a more permissive standard in determining congressional intent concerning
the zone of interests protected by, or regulated by, a particular statute. 9
In Central Arizona, plaintiffs attempting to avoid clean air compliance
costs imposed by the EPA were granted standing under the CAA, o de-
spite the fact that their suit could reasonably be construed as likely to
frustrate the environmental protection objectives of the CAA
In Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, the Sierra Club challenged
the construction of a Umversity of Arizona astronomical observatory au-
thorized by the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988 (AICA),"' on
the grounds that it would jeopardize a population of endangered red squir-
rels." The Ninth Circuit granted the Sierra Club standing to seek judi-
cial review of the AICA, despite the Umversity's arguments that the sole
purpose of Title VI of the AICA was to expedite the construction of the
observatory by excluding the project from challenges based upon section 7
of the ESA.'" The court stated:
The Umversity, citing Clarke, argues that Sierra Club's interests are
wholly inconsistent with the purposes of the AICA. Even if it were so,
this is only half an argument. Under Clarke, we would have to conclude
not only that Sierra Club's interest is inconsistent with the purposes of
the AICA, but also that this inconsistency is so fundamental as to make
it impossible to believe that Congress intended to permit Sierra Club to
bring suit That judicial review is not expressly forbidden by the
AICA is, under the particular circumstances of this case, substantial
evidence that it was not intended implicitly to be foreclosed.'24
Thus, the Ninth Circuit used a permissive standard to determine con-
118. 8 F.3d at 716.
119. See Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1539; see also Pacific Northwest Generating Coop v.
Brown, 38 F.3d at 1065; Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d at 1582.
120. 990 F.2d at 1538. In footnote 6 of Bennett, the court attempted to distinguish the facts of
Central Arizona from those of Bennett, stating that the Central Arizona plaintiffs were directly regulat-
ed and thus the zone of interests test did not apply in Central Arizona. See Bennett, 63 F.3d at 920
n.6. However, m Central Arizona, the court held that the plaintiffs were indirectly regulated and the
zone of interests test did apply. See 990 F.2d at 1538-39. Whether or not the zone of interests test
should have applied in either of these cases, it is clear the court applied a different standard m each
case.
121. Pub. L. No. iO-696, 102 Stat. 4571 (1988).
122. 986 F.2d at 1570.
123. Id at 1582.
124. Id. at 1582-83.
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gressional intent in order to grant standing to the Sierra Club, despite the
fact that its suit could be reasonably construed as frustrating the purpose
of Title VI of the AICA.
The inconsistency with which the Ninth Circuit has applied the zone
of interests test for standing, as well as the conflict between the circuits as
to whether the zone of interests test should be applied at all to the citizen-
suit provisions of federal statutes, makes this subject ripe for review by
the U.S. Supreme Court. It is time for the U.S. Supreme Court to elabo-
rate on Clarke and give the lower courts better instructions on how to
gauge congressional intent concerning the issue of standing to challenge
federal regulatory actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court should overturn the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Bennett v Plenert. In Clarke, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that determining congressional intent was the key to applying the zone of
interests test. In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted Clarke by recog-
nizing only half of the factors that Clarke set out as necessary to deter-
mine congressional intent concerning the zone of interests associated with
a particular statute. In Clarke, the U.S. Supreme Court followed Data
Processing by requring that a plaintiff seeking judicial review of federal
regulatory actions must show that the interest they seek to protect is "ar-
guably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute 9A25 The Ninth Circuit, in Bennett, only considered the inter-
ests protected by the ESA in determining congressional intent, not the
interests regulated by the ESA.
In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit also contradicted its own decision in
Central Arizona by ignoring Clarke's holding that: "The [zone of inter-
ests] test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need
be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plain-
tiff."' The Ninth Circuit applied a demanding test in Bennett that ex-
cluded the Plaintiffs' economic interests, reasoning that the ESA was not
designed to benefit plaintiffs who did not claim to be advancing the inter-
ests of an endangered species. Yet, in Central Arizona and Mount Graham
Red Squirrel, the Ninth Circuit granted standing to plaintiffs using the
zone of interests test, despite the fact that these plaintiffs' interests were
likely to frustrate the objectives of the CAA and the AICA, respectively
The U.S. Supreme Court should adopt a more flexible zone of inter-
ests test, one which gives the same consideration to plaintiffs whose inter-
125. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397 (citing Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153 (1970)).
126. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400 (cltng Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)).
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ests are regulated by a statute as to those whose interests are protected by
the statute. This would allow standing for parties aggrieved by federal
regulatory action while at the same time limiting the potential for frivolous
suits. Plaintiffs would, of course, still have to meet the Article III require-
ments for standing set out in Lujan. Since Congress included citizen-suit
provisions in statutes because it did not entirely trust executive agencies to
carry out its legislative retentions,127 a zone of interests test that liberally
construes congressional intent would help check regulatory agency arro-
gance while still providing for both fairness and judicial efficiency
There is a good chance that the U.S. Supreme Court will overturn the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Bennett. Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court's
leading scholar on the issue of standing, and author of the Lujan decision,
generally favors standing restrictions such as the zone of interests test, but
he has stated that plaintiffs who represent minority interests and have
suffered "concrete injury" may be entitled to standing to challenge federal
regulatory actions."
Another factor which may play a role in the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision concerning Bennett is the hostility of the Court's conservatives to
liberal holdings from the Ninth Circuit generally, and in particular those
written by the author of the Bennett opinion, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, a
situation described by one observer as "ideological warfare." 29 Reihardt
has openly criticized the conservative bent of the present U.S. Supreme
Court, and has commented as follows on his high reversal rate by the
Supreme Court: "Some of them may get reversed, others don't, and we
can't worry about that."'"
POSTSCRIPT
On March 19, 1997, the United States Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in the case of Bennett v. Spear .. In a unanimous opinion written
by Justice Antonm Scalia, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision
m Bennett v. Plenert."'
In appealing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Petitioners raised two
issues for the Supreme Court to consider: 1) whether the zone of interests
127. See Cass R. Sunstem, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Arti-
cle 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 193 (1992).
128. See Antonm Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894-95 (1983).
129. See David M. O'Bnen, Reinhardt and the Supreme Court: This Time It's Personal, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at M2.
130. Id.
131. See 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (Michael Spear replaced Marvin Plenert as Director of Region 1
of the USFWS).
132. Id. at 1169.
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test applies to claims brought under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA,
and 2) if the zone of interests test applies, do the Petitioners have standing
under that test even though they seek to protect economic rather than envi-
ronmental interests.'33 Justice Scalia noted that the Government, in mak-
ing its case before the Supreme Court, had made no effort to defend the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Bennett v Plenert."34 Instead, the Gov-
ernment presented three theories which it claimed supported affirnming the
Ninth Circuit's decision; these were:
(1) that petitioners fail to meet the standing requirements imposed by
Article III of the Constitution; (2) that the ESA's citizen-suit provision
does not authorize judicial review of the types of claims advanced by
petitioners; and (3) that judicial review is unavailable under the APA
because the Biological Opinion does not constitute final agency ac-
tion.'35
The Supreme Court first considered the question of whether the zone
of interests test applies to the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, the issue
the Ninth Circuit had found dispositive in Bennett v Plenert.'" In ana-
lyzing this question, Justice Scalia distinguished between constitutional
limitations on standing in cases involving federal court jurisdiction, such
as the Article lI requirements, and prudential limitations on standing, such
as the zone of interests test.'37 Justice Scalia found that despite their sim-
ilar purpose in limiting the role of the courts in a democratic society, there
was a key difference between constitutional limits on standing and pruden-
tial limits, such as the zone of interests test-namely that Congress was
free to modify or eliminate prudential limitations on standing."' The
Court held that Congress had exercised this power when it included the
language "any person may commence a civil suit" in the citizen-suit provi-
sion of the ESA.'39 This language contrasted with more restrictive lan-
guage included in the citizen-suit provisions of some other federal stat-
utes.14o
The Court also cited two reasons to broadly interpret the term "any
person" contained in the ESA's citizen-suit provision. First, the ESA is
concerned with the environment, a subject which the Court felt that all
133. Id. at 1160.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1161.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1162.
140. Id. (citing, inter alia, Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 13 6 5 (g) (1994)).
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people had an interest M.141 Second, the Court found that the purpose of
the ESA's citizen-suit provision was to encourage "private attorneys gen-
eral," as evidenced by its provisions eliminating the amount in controversy
and diversity of citizenship requirements, its provision for the recovery of
legal costs, and its provision allowing the Government to take the place of
plaintiffs in citizen suits.142
Applying this reasoning to the facts of Bennett, Justice Scalia found
that the ESA's citizen-suit provision granted standing to plaintiffs asserting
government "overenforcement" of the ESA, as well as to plaintiffs claim-
ing "underenforcement."' 43 Scalia stated that "there is no textual basis
for saying that [the ESA's citizen-suit provision's] expansion of standing
requirements applies to environmentalists alone.'"
Next, the Court addressed whether all of Petitioners' claims were re-
viewable. The Court noted that section 11 of the ESA allows citizen suits
seeking to enjoin government officials from violating any provision of the
ESA, 45 and also allows citizens to bring actions against the Secretary of
the Interior for failure to perform non-discretionary duties under the
ESA.'" However, the Court found that the Petitioners' claim that the
Biological Opinion implicitly designated critical habitat for the endangered
suckers without taking into consideration the economic impact of such a
designation, was the only reviewable claim under the ESA's citizen-suit
provision.47 The Government claimed that the designation of critical
habitat under the ESA was a discretionary duty of the Secretary of the
Interior (the Secretary), and thus exempted from challenge under the
ESA's citizen-suit provision, which requires that the duty sought to be
enforced by a citizen suit not be "discretionary with the Secretary."'"
However, Justice Scalia found that the consideration of economic impacts
was an obligatory step in making decisions under the ESA, and thus was
not discretionary. 49 Therefore, the Court held that the Petitioners had
standing to press tus claim under the ESA's citizen-suit provision.5'
The Court found that the Petitioners' claims that the USFWS had violated
Section 7 of the ESA, by not using the "best scientific and commercial
data available" in formulating the Biological Opinion, were "obviously not
141. Id.
142. Id
143. Id at 1163.
144. Id
145. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1994).
146. § 1540(g)(1)(C).
147. 117 S. Ct. at 1165.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1166.
150. Id.
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reviewable" under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. 5'
The Court also analyzed the question of whether the zone of interests
test would preclude the Petitioners from standing to bring their APA
claims.152 The Court looked to the substantive provisions of the ESA to
answer this question.'53 Justice Scalia concluded that the Ninth Circuit
had erred when it held that the Petitioners did not have standing under the
APA because they were not directly regulated by the ESA and because
they did not seek to further the overall purpose of the ESA, which is
species preservation.'54
In analyzing tlus issue, Justice Scalia used the classic formulation of
the zone of interests test as set out in Data Processing: "whether the inter-
est sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."'55 Scalia stated:
Whether a plaintiff's interest is 'arguably protected by the stat-
ute" within the meaning of the zone of interests test is to be determined
not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question (here,
species preservation), but by reference to the particular provision of law
upon which the plaintiff relies. It is difficult to see how the Ninth Circuit
could have failed to see this from our cases. 56
The Court found that the Petitioners' claim that the USFWS had not
used "the best scientific and commercial data available" in formulating the
Biological Opinion, as required by Section 7 of the ESA, fell within the
zone of interests protected by that part of the ESA, thus, judicial review
was appropriate under the APA.5 7 Justice Scalia found that the purpose
of the ESA requirement that each agency "use the best scientific and com-
mercial data available" was not only intended to further species preserva-
tion, but also "to avoid needless economc dislocation produced by agency
officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objec-
tives."'58 Thus, the Court found that the Petitioners' claim that they were
the victims of such zealous but unintelligent agency action was within the
zone of interests protected by Section 7 of the ESA. 59
The Court also found that the Petitioners had established the mini-
151. Id. at 1165.
152. See id. at 1167.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1167.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1168.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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mum Article III constitutional standing requirements."w They had shown
injury m fact because if the Biological Opinion was implemented, the
Bureau would have less Klamath Project water to distribute to its custom-
ers. 6 Therefore, it was likely that the reduction would be distributed pro
rata among its customers." The Petitioners also had shown there was a
causal connection between the action complained of, the Biological Opm-
ion, and their injury, which was less water available for distribution.63
The Court found that the Biological Opinion was not merely "advisory,"
but in fact would have a coercive effect on the Bureau's operation of the
Klamath Project.'" Finally, the Petitioners had shown that it was likely
that their injury would be redressed by a favorable decision, since the
Bureau had operated the Klamath Project m the same way for nearly a
century before the issuance of the Biological Opinion by the USFWS. 16
The United States Supreme Court, in Bennett v. Spear, agreed with
the Eighth Circuit's decision m Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, by holding
that Congress had exempted citizens using the ESA's citizen-suit provision
from prudential standing requirements, such as the zone of interests test.
The Court also adopted a more flexible zone of interests test for APA
claims, requiring only that plamtiffs show that the particular provision of a
statute upon which they rely protects their interest. Plaintiffs will no lon-
ger have to show that their action will further the overall purpose of the
statute, as they would have under the zone of interests test formulated by
the Ninth Circuit in Bennett v. Plenert. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Bennett v. Spear represents another defeat for the Ninth Circuit in its
ongoing ideological battle with the Supreme Court.
160. Id. at 1163-65.
161. 1& at 1164.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1165.
164. Id. at 1164.
165. d at 1165.
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